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Abstract
Using firm-, industry-, and country-level data, we document a link between family own-
ership and labor relations. Across countries, we find that family ownership is relatively
more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are diﬃcult, consistent with firm-level
evidence suggesting that family firms are particularly eﬀective at coping with diﬃcult la-
bor relations. Our cross-country results are robust to controlling for minority shareholder
protection and other potential determinants of family ownership. Our results also hold if
we use strike data from the 1960s to predict cross-country variation in family ownership
thirty years later. We address causality in two ways. First, we instrument our measure of
the quality of labor relations using ‘Labor Origin’, a variable describing the extent to which
the emerging European liberal states in the 18th and 19th centuries confronted guilds and
labor organizations. Second, making use of within-country variation at the industry level, we
show that–controlling for industry and country fixed eﬀects–industries that are more labor
dependent have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse labor relations.
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1 Introduction
Across countries, there is considerable variation in the extent to which firms are either family-
owned or widely held. Some of this variation can be explained by poor legal protection of
minority shareholders. In their study of 27 wealthy countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (1999) find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries with poor
minority shareholder protection.1 And yet, explanations for the cross-country variation in family
ownership based on diﬀerences in minority shareholder protection leave a significant fraction of
the variance unexplained. In this paper, we show that part of this variation can be explained
by diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations across countries.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that (i) family firms are particularly eﬀective
at coping with diﬃcult labor relations, and, consistent with this picture, (ii) family ownership
is relatively more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are diﬃcult.
Family firms are particularly eﬀective at coping with diﬃcult labor relations. Our cross-country
study shows that countries with hostile labor relations have relatively more family ownership
than do countries with cooperative labor relations. To help understand why hostile labor re-
lations might be particularly conducive to family ownership, we first attempt to shed light
on the ‘micro-mechanism’ linking family ownership and labor relations. Going back in time,
we describe how during the Gilded Age–in response to severe industrial violence and labor
unrest–industrial pioneers and founding families successfully established generous corporate
welfare programs to appease workers. From an economic viewpoint, ‘corporate (or welfare) pa-
ternalism’ is best understood as an implicit labor contract between the firm and its workers,
and our reading of the historical literature on welfare paternalism points to two advantages of
family firms with respect to such implicit contracts. First, controlling families are likely to have
a longer time horizon than do professional managers.2 Second, and equally important, the fact
1See Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) for theoretical models along
these lines. For an early empirical study on the determinants of corporate ownership structure within the United
States, see Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The study does not address causality, however.
2 In a similar vein, Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that–because of their longer time horizon–family firms
have a comparative advantage in a repeated-game like situation: “Professional CEO’s careers are relatively brief.
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that the controlling family has a large ownership stake implies that it can safeguard the implicit
labor contract–and thus workers’ interests–against the “greedy demands” (Zahavi, 1988, p.
138) of (short-term oriented) minority stockholders.3
We subsequently provide firm-level evidence from France which is consistent with the notion
that today’s family firms (still) practice a ‘mild version’ of 19th century welfare paternalism. In
particular, family firms seem to provide more employment insurance to their workers than do
widely held firms. Workers, in turn, seem to be more loyal to family firms, in the sense that
family firms have fewer strikes and lower unionization rates. Overall, this evidence suggests
that family firms have important benefits that are particularly valuable when labor relations
are diﬃcult. Given that there is likely to be a cost associated with family ownership–such as
forgone diversification benefits–we might expect to find relatively more family firms in countries
with diﬃcult labor relations.
While the particular ‘micro-mechanism’ described here focuses on implicit labor contracts,
it is not the only conceivable one. Like this paper, Roe (2000, 2003) argues that family firms
are more eﬀective at coping with labor pressure. Roe’s main argument is that weakly monitored
managers will not fight as strongly for shareholders as will strongly monitored managers. Weakly
monitored managers will too easily give in to labor pressure to avoid conflict, because they do
not pay for the concessions they make to labor (shareholders do), but “they take a great deal
of heat for resisting [labor pressure]” (Roe, 2003).4 Hence, strong labor pressure exacerbates
managerial agency costs inside the firm, demanding a stronger monitoring of managers, and thus
favoring family ownership over widely held ownership.
Countries with hostile labor relations have relatively more family ownership than do countries
with cooperative labor relations. Using survey-based measures to describe the ‘quality’ of a
In contrast, family control endures, with patriarchs grooming scions, sometimes for decades”.
3A third argument is that controlling families are less well diversified than small stockholders, implying that
they have a relatively stronger preference for ‘stability’–for instance, they suﬀer more from work disruptions due
to labor conflict at one particular firm than do small stockholders–which lends their promise to maintain and
safeguard the implicit labor contract more credibility. See Roe (2000), who argues that “incompletely diversified
family stockholders ... prefer stability more strongly than diversified ... public firm stockholders.”
4For empirical evidence consistent with this view, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003).
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country’s labor relations, we find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries
with hostile labor relations. This result holds for diﬀerent measures of family ownership as well
as for diﬀerent subsamples (e.g., Europe, Asia, Western countries). It also holds if we control for
minority shareholder protection, law enforcement, stock market development, income inequality,
labor regulation, union bargaining power, the pro-labor orientation of governments, and various
other controls. Finally, the result holds if we replace our survey-based measures of the quality
of labor relations with actual strike data from the 1960s. As it turns out, high strike activity in
the 1960s can predict family ownership thirty years later.
Our robustness results suggest that it is important to distinguish between labor hostility and
measures of ‘formal’ labor empowerment, such as labor union strength, labor regulation, and
the pro-labor orientation of governments.5 With regard to predicting family ownership, what
seems to matter more than measures of ‘formal’ labor empowerment is the extent to which labor
is hostile or cooperative, which–as we will argue below–is rooted in a country’s historical
experience (and, possibly, its culture). In fact, controlling for the quality of labor relations,
measures of ‘formal’ labor empowerment are not significant in our regressions.
The quality of labor relations has a causal eﬀect on the extent of family ownership. We address
the issue of causality in two diﬀerent ways. We first look into the historical causes for the observed
diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations across countries. In his classic book, historian Colin
Crouch (1993) documents the struggles by the emerging European liberal states in the 18th
and 19th centuries to maintain a political monopoly, or more broadly, to claim what he calls
‘political space’. The liberal states’ exclusive claim to political space implied that they became
‘jealous’ of other organized interests who sought to claim political space, notably guilds and
labor organizations. According to Crouch, there is substantial variation in the way the diﬀerent
5Compare, for example, Sweden and Italy. Employment protection is tighter, and the government is more
pro-labor, in Sweden than it is in Italy (Table III in Botero et. al (2004) and Table 6.5 in Roe (2003), respectively).
Moreover, labor unions are much stronger in Sweden. In 1994, for example, Sweden’s trade union density was
91%, while in Italy it was only 39% (OECD, 1997). Likewise, the bargaining power of labor unions, as perceived
by executives, is much higher in Sweden (Table 2a in this paper.) And yet, labor relations are much more hostile
in Italy (Table 2a in this paper.) Hence, Sweden has strong yet cooperative labor unions, while Italy has–based
on ‘formal’ measures–weaker yet hostile and, to a considerable degree, anti-capitalist labor unions.
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liberal states dealt with the attempts of guilds to occupy political space, which, he argues, has
had a lasting eﬀect on the countries’ industrial relations until the present. In some countries,
the liberal states confronted guilds and labor organizations–even declaring them illegal–which
led to the formation of highly oppositional labor movements. In other countries, the liberal
states embraced the guilds as a ‘social partner’, since the states were dependent on the guilds’
organizational resources to manage their own public aﬀairs.
Depending on the nature of the encounter between liberalism and guild society in the 18th
and 19th centuries, Crouch distinguishes between three broad categories: ‘political inhibitors’,
‘political neutrals’, and ‘political facilitators’. Based on Crouch’s classification, we introduce
a new variable, ‘Labor Origin’, consisting of dummies indicating to which category a country
belongs. When we instrument our survey-based measure of the quality of labor relations using
Labor Origin, we find strong support for our previous OLS results, suggesting that the quality
of labor relations has a causal eﬀect on the extent of family ownership.
The second way to address causality makes use of within-country variation at the industry
level, following the methodology suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Using the United
States as our benchmark, we compute labor shares to measure industries’ labor dependence.
The hypothesis we test is whether–controlling for industry and country fixed eﬀects–industries
that are more labor dependent have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse
labor relations. In particular, the ability to correct for country fixed eﬀects alleviates concerns
about an omitted variable bias. Consistent with our previous OLS results, we find that the
interaction term between industries’ labor shares and the quality of countries’ labor relations is
negative and strongly significant.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 tries to shed light on the ‘micro-
mechanism’ linking family ownership and labor relations. Section 3 presents the data. Section
4 presents our basic OLS regressions and considers the robustness of our results by controlling
for various other potential determinants of family ownership. Section 5 addresses the issue
of causality using an instrumental variables approach, while Section 6 addresses the issue of
causality using industry level data. Section 7 uses actual strike data to predict cross-country
variation in family ownership. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Family Firms and Implicit Labor Contracts
To help understand why hostile labor relations might be particularly conducive to family own-
ership, we first attempt to shed light on the ‘micro-mechanism’ linking family ownership and
labor relations. Going back in time, we describe how in the late 19th century–in response to
severe industrial violence and labor militancy–industrial pioneers and founding families suc-
cessfully established generous corporate welfare programs to appease workers. We subsequently
provide firm-level evidence from France consistent with the notion that today’s family firms
(still) practice a ‘mild version’ of 19th century welfare paternalism.
2.1 Welfare Paternalism during the Gilded Age
Labor conflicts turned so severe in the late 19th century that Charles Henderson, the famous
University of Chicago industrial sociologist, warned that industrial warfare would destroy not
only work relations but the very fabric of American society. Employers responded with repres-
sion. When in 1892 workers of the Carnegie Steel Company’s Homestead plant resisted wage
cuts, the company sent Pinkerton detectives to assume control of the plant grounds. The en-
suing showdown was vicious. By day’s end, nine steel workers and seven Pinkertons had died,
and more than three hundred men, mostly Pinkertons, had been wounded.
While exceptional in the acuity of its violence, the Homestead aﬀair was nevertheless symp-
tomatic of the industrial violence that gripped the United States during the Gilded Age. Con-
fronted with heightened industrial violence and labor militancy, industrial pioneers like George
Pullman, Harold Patterson, Harold McCormick, and Henry John Heinz opted for a diﬀerent
solution: corporate (or welfare) paternalism.6 As one labor historian put it, “setting aside their
guns, employers strove to crush labor through kindness” (Tone, 1997, p. 3).7 Proﬀering the car-
rot rather than the stick, employers built low-cost homes for their workers, established medical
and relief departments that included surgical, dental, and sick relief services, promoted ath-
6“The emergence of corporate paternalism was ultimately a product of conflict” (Zahavi, 1988, p. 2).
7After disaﬀected employees of the National Cash Register Company (NCR) set the factory on fire three times
in the early 1890s, its president and founder, John Patterson, decided that “more interest would have to be taken
in our employees to make them better workers.” In the ensuing decade, NCR became the nation’s leading example
of corporate welfare work (Tone, 1997, p. 66).
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letic programs, and provided countless other services, including lectures, art and dance classes,
Sunday outings, and dining rooms serving low-cost lunches.
Employers did not disguise that their welfare programs were designed to maintain worker
docility and to retain control over the work force. It was merely asserted that welfare work was
a more eﬀective means of control than was repression. Workers were oﬃcially viewed as part
of one big family. At Endicott Johnson, the Binghampton, New York, shoe manufacturer, for
example, new workers received a booklet declaring “You have now joined the Happy Family”
(Zahavi, 1983, p. 605). The notion of being part of one big happy family connoted more than
just a collegial corporate culture. It represented a personal bond between Endicott Johnson’s
workers and the firm’s patriarch, George F. Johnson:
“The family connoted harmony, security, authority, and stability–all values that the
corporation sought to develop and exploit. It was a powerful metaphor, an image
both confining and comforting and one that promoted internal resolution of conflict.
Furthermore, the deliberate transposition of George F. Johnson into a father figure,
a role that suited his temperament, was aimed at making industrial protest and
rebellion the equivalent of patricide” (Zahavi, 1983, p. 607, italics added).
Welfare paternalism is perhaps best understood as an implicit labor contract between the
firm and its workers, whereby the firm provided its workers with basic family needs–medical
care, relief, recreation, and housing–in exchange for the workers’ loyalty.8 On the firm’s side,
the guarantor that the firm would keep its promises was the patriarch, or controlling family,
who provided for the workers’ welfare as a personal responsibility (Mandell, 2002). There
are numerous anecdotes in which Endicott Johnson’s patriarch, George F. Johnson, personally
fetched injured workers to a doctor, approved questionable appeals by workers for aid, and
overruled decisions by his supervisors to lay oﬀ workers.9
8“Welfare capitalism at Endicott Johnson existed as a compact ... built on mutual loyalties” (Zahavi, 1983,
p. 605). Likewise, John Patterson, founder and president of NCR, described corporate welfare work as a “give-
and-take proposition of mutual benefits and mutual responsibility” (Mandell, 2002, p. 19).
9“The employee in question was an older man with several children, and the act of letting go such a worker
troubled Johnson’s conscience ... Johnson sent the following note to the supervisor who laid him oﬀ: This is not
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To maintain the company’s welfare program in the wake of the Great Depression, George F.
Johnson even went as far as cutting common stock dividends, provoking the anger of his fellow
stockholders.10 When a stockholder complained about the use of company funds to finance
relief eﬀorts, Johnson replied: “As a stockholder, you have a perfect right to object the use of
‘company funds’, but unfortunately we cannot separate ‘stockholder’s money’ from the working
men’s money” (Zahavi, 1988, p. 137). On a diﬀerent occasion, when confronted with the
demands of minority stockholders, Johnson’s anger grew more intense: “As long as I am on
earth to vote, I will never give the stockholders any more than I am willing to give the workers”
(Zahavi, 1988, p. 138).
Our reading of the historical literature on welfare paternalism in the United States points to
two important advantages of family firms with regard to implicit labor contracts. First, families
are likely to have a longer time horizon than do professional managers, with the eﬀect that
workers may find it easier to establish a personal bond with, and develop loyalty to, the family
(Tone, 1997; Mandell, 2002). Second, as we have shown above in the case of Endicott Johnson,
the fact that the controlling family has a large ownership stake implies that it can safeguard
the implicit labor contract–and thus the workers’ interests–against the “greedy demands of
[minority] stockholders” (Zahavi, 1988, p. 138).
Intended as an “antidote to late-nineteenth-century social conflict,” [corporate] “welfare work
promised to fight labor activism by weakening the attraction of unions and redirecting workers’
loyalty to the company” (Mandell, 2002, p. 18 & 21). How eﬀective was welfare paternalism in
accomplishing its goals? According to historian David Brody, welfare paternalism managed to
bring about a decline in union membership and a muting of labor militancy (Brody, 1993). At
Endicott Johnson, for example, quit rates between 1930 and 1946–when systematic data are
available–were 40% - 60% of the industry average (Zahavi, 1988, p. 53): “Workers were loyal
workers. ... The vast majority of them repeatedly rejected unionization. Prolonged strikes were
“cold-blooded business.” ... Maybe you could run two or three days a week and not have to absolutely lay oﬀ so
many people” (Zahavi, 1988, p. 127).
10While the Johnson family was the primary stockholder of Endicott Johnson, there were others, including
company oﬃcers, who held about 17% of the firm’s common stock. George F. Johnson estimated that the proposed
dividend cut would cost him alone about $100,000 of his personal wealth.
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unheard of. By the criteria of unionists, radical critics, and labor historians, then, welfarism at
Endicott Johnson was a success, creating and sustaining a labor loyalty to the corporation that
endured even the Depression” (Zahavi, 1988, p. 119).11
2.2 Family Firms Today
In today’s world, family firms rarely provide the kind of generous welfare programs they used
to provide in the age of welfare paternalism. Yet there is evidence consistent with the notion
that today’s family firms (still) practice a ‘mild version’ of welfare paternalism. Like in the
case of Endicott Johnson–where layoﬀ rates were 24 times lower than the industry average
(Zahavi, 1988)–family firms appear to provide more employment insurance to their workers
than do widely held firms. Using French panel data, Sraer and Thesmar (2004) document that
employment in family firms is less sensitive to industry shocks than it is in widely held firms,
which the authors note is “consistent with the fact that, because of their diﬀerent time horizons,
heir-managed corporations have a comparative advantage when enforcing implicit insurance
contracts with their labor force.” We find a similar result for the United States (not reported):
Among the 1,000 largest publicly traded companies in the United States, those with a significant
ultimate owner (5% or more) are less likely to reduce employment than are widely held firms.12
Similar to our historical discussion of welfare paternalism above, we may ask if providing
employment insurance is an eﬀective means of mitigating labor militancy and “weakening the
attraction of unions and redirecting workers’ loyalty to the company” (Mandell, 2002, p. 18 &
21)?13 To address this question, we match Sraer and Thesmar’s data with data from the ‘Enquête
Réponses’, a survey of managers conducted in 1998 to study plant level work organization in
France. Using Sraer and Thesmar’s classification, we classify a family firm as one in which
the founder or a member of the founder’s family holds at least 20% of the voting rights. Two
11 In an election to unionize Endicott Johnson in 1940, the shoe workers’ union was soundly defeated by a
margin of nearly five to one. Historian Gerald Zahavi concludes that “the unions were and remained “outsiders”
in what most workers considered a family aﬀair” (Zahavi, 1988, p. 169).
12The result is obtained after controlling for firm size, firm age, and industry fixed eﬀects.
13Workers seem to pay a premium for receiving employment insurance: Controlling for workers’ skills and age,
Sraer and Thesmar (2004) find that family firms pay lower wages than do widely held firms.
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questions from the survey are of particular interest for us. One question asks whether there has
been a strike in the three years prior to the survey; the other question asks for the percentage
of workers that are unionized.
A first look at the data suggests that strikes are indeed less prevalent in family firms. While
only 18% of family firms had witnessed strikes in the three years prior to the survey, the corre-
sponding number for widely held firms is 40%. To verify that this result is not driven by family
firms’ clustering in particular industries, or by the (often smaller) size of family firms, we run
a logit regression in which we control for industry dummies and number of employees. The
results, which are displayed in column (i) of Table A, confirm that family firms are less likely to
experience strikes than are widely held firms.
We obtain similar results if we use the percentage of unionized workers as our dependent
variable. The results, which are displayed in column (ii) of Table A, show that–after control-
ling for industry fixed eﬀects and number of employees–widely held firms appear to have a
higher percentage of unionized workers than do family firms. That the two regressions–the one
measuring strike incidence and the other measuring the percentage of unionized workers–yield
similar results is perhaps not surprising. Given the radicalism of French labor unions, a strong
union presence on the firm level is likely to imply a higher incidence of strikes.
Let us summarize. Welfare paternalism–the introduction of generous corporate welfare
programs by industrial pioneers and founding families in the late 19th century–emerged in
response to severe industrial violence and labor conflict. By the accounts of historians, welfare
paternalism was highly successful in appeasing workers, reducing strikes, and keeping labor
unions out. More than a century later, it seems as if family firms still practice a ‘mild version’
of 19th century welfare paternalism. French family firms appear to provide more employment
insurance to their workers than do widely held firms and, in return, appear to have fewer strikes
and lower unionization rates. Overall, these results suggest that family firms have important
benefits that are especially valuable when labor relations are diﬃcult, which is why we might
expect to find more family firms in countries with diﬃcult labor relations. The remainder of
this paper tests this hypothesis.
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3 Data
3.1 Ownership Data
Ownership of Publicly Held Companies
The main focus of our study lies on the ownership of publicly held companies. Our ownership
data comes from four sources: Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) (henceforth CDL), Faccio
and Lang (2002) (henceforth FL), Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005) (henceforth GLY), and
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) (henceforth LLS). All these papers examine
the ultimate ownership of publicly held companies, meaning ownership is traced back to the
individual and family level. Each paper contains a discussion of the data sources and how the
respective ownership measures have been constructed. For the sake of brevity, we shall not
repeat this information here.
CDL provide ownership data for nine East Asian countries for the year 1996: Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
The final sample includes 2,980 firms, representing 56% of all publicly traded firms in the nine
countries. CDL measure family control both in terms of the fraction of firms controlled by
families (20% cutoﬀ) and the fraction of the total market capitalization controlled by the top
5 families. Table 3a reports the correlation between these two measures. As is shown in Table
2a, with the exception of Japan, family control is pervasive in East Asia. While only 10% of
Japanese firms are controlled by families, the fraction of family-controlled firms in the other
countries ranges from 45% (Philippines) to 72% (Indonesia). A similar picture emerges with
respect to the fraction of the total market capitalization controlled by the top 5 families. While
the top 5 families in Japan control only 2% of the total market capitalization, the number for
the other countries ranges from 20% (Singapore) to 43% (Philippines).
FL provide ownership data for 13 Western European countries for the period from 1996 to
1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The final sample includes 5,232 firms, repre-
senting 94% of all publicly traded firms in the 13 countries. FL construct the same two measures
of family control as CDL. The correlation between these two measures is reported in Table 3b.
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As is shown in Table 2a, family control is also pervasive in Western Europe: The fraction of
firms controlled by families ranges from 24% (United Kingdom) to 65% (France and Germany),
while the fraction of the total market capitalization controlled by the top 5 families ranges from
4% (United Kingdom) to 25% (Portugal).
GLY provide ownership data for 3607 publicly traded companies in the United States for
1996. As is shown in Table 2a, only 20% of the firms are controlled by families (20% cutoﬀ),
which implies that the United States ranks second after Japan as the country with the most
widely dispersed (ultimate) ownership.
LLS provide ownership data for 27 wealthy countries, primarily from 1995 and 1996. The
focus is on the 20 largest firms in each country as measured by the firms’ market capitalization
of equity. As is shown in Table 2a, the fraction of family-controlled firms (20% cutoﬀ) among
the top 20 firms ranges from 0% (United Kingdom) to 70% (Hong Kong). The results using
value-weighted measures are similar. LLS also construct a sample of 10 medium-sized publicly
traded firms for each country. There, the fraction of family-controlled firms (20% cutoﬀ) is
higher, ranging from 10% (Japan and the United States) to 100% (Greece). Table 3c reports
the correlations among all three measures of family control.
There are 30 countries in total for which we have both ownership data and data on the quality
of labor relations. Unfortunately, CDL-FL-GLY and LLS construct their ownership measures
in diﬀerent ways. Moreover ,while CDL-FL-GLY cover a large fraction of all publicly traded
firms in each country, LLS cover only the 20 largest firms, and their selection criteria make it
potentially diﬃcult to compare large and small countries. To obtain consistent measures for all
30 countries, we proceed in two steps. Whenever possible, we use the two measures of family
control from CDL-FL-GLY: the fraction of firms controlled by families (20% cutoﬀ), and the
fraction of the total market capitalization controlled by the top 5 families. This provides us
with 23 countries. For the remaining seven countries–Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece,
Israel, Netherlands, and New Zealand–we use predicted values using data from LLS based on
the following regression:14
14As we will show later, our basic results are robust to dropping those countries for which we have only
predicted values based on LLS.
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Fami,j = αj + β0j LLSi + εij , (1)
where Fami,j is the particular measure j of family control for country i in CDL-FL-GLY, and
where LLSi is the vector of the three measures of family control for country i in LLS. For the
first measure in CDL-FL-GLY–the fraction of firms controlled by families–we obtain an R2 of
43% for the 18 countries included both in CDL-FL-GLY and LLS. For the second measure–the
fraction of the total market capitalization controlled by the top 5 families–we obtain an R2 of
41%.
State Ownership
In some of our robustness regressions we use state ownership as our dependent variable.
Our measure of state ownership is constructed the same way as our measure of family control:
Whenever possible, we use the measure from FL-GLY. (The regressions in question do not
include Asian countries.) For the remaining countries, we use predicted values using data from
LLS based on a regression similar to equation (1).
Ownership of Publicly and Privately Held Business Groups
Fogel (2005) constructs various measures of the ultimate ownership of the 10 largest non-
government business groups in each country for 1996. Unlike our main ownership variables,
which are based on publicly traded companies, Fogel’s sample includes both publicly and pri-
vately held business groups. Fogel constructs four measures of family control, which are all
highly correlated. The particular measure we use in our regressions is the labor-weighted frac-
tion of the 10 largest business groups controlled by families (20% cutoﬀ), abbreviated by PV in
Fogel’s paper.
3.2 Labor Relations Data
Cooperative Labor Relations
Our measures of the quality of labor relations are taken from two surveys. The first survey,
conducted by the International Institute of Management Development (IMD), is published in
the World Competitiveness Yearbook. The survey is sent to thousands of executives each year.
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In 2003, for example, it was sent to 4,256 executives in 59 countries. Besides various other
questions, the executives are asked to respond to the following statement: “Labor relations are
generally ... (hostile, productive)”. Responses may vary from 1 to 10, a low number indicating
hostile labor relations. Table 2b reports the survey results for 1999 and 2003. While we have
this data from 1996 onwards, the country rankings are highly correlated over time. For instance,
the correlation between the 1999 and 2003 rankings is 90% (Table 3d).
The second survey is conducted by the World Economic Forum and published in the Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR). Similar to the IMD survey, the survey is sent to thousands
of executives each year in over 50 countries. The question that is most relevant for our study
asks the executives if they agree with the statement “Labor/employer relations are generally
cooperative”. Responses may vary from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement). Table
2b displays the country rankings for the years 1993, 1999, and 2003. While we have this data
also for other years, the country rankings are again highly correlated over time. As is shown in
Table 3d, the correlations between the 1993, 1999, and 2003 country rankings lie between 89%
and 97%.
In 1999 the GCR asked a more nuanced question: The executives were asked if they agree
with the statement “Strikes are rare and always quickly resolved with minimum economic losses”.
The results are reported in Table 2b. As is shown in Table 3d, the country ranking correlates
strongly with the country rankings from the question asking whether “Labor/employer relations
are generally cooperative”.
Not only are our measures of the quality of labor relations highly correlated over time, but
there is also a strong correlation across the two surveys. For example, the correlation between the
IMD and GCR measures in 1999 (2003) is 94% (91%). On the other hand, our measures of the
quality of labor relations are uncorrelated with the perceived bargaining power of workers. Each
year, the GCR survey asks executives to respond to the statement “The collective bargaining
power of workers is high”. For the sake of brevity, Table 2a only displays the result for one year,
1999, but the results are similar for other years. As is shown in Table 3d, there is no correlation
between the (perceived) bargaining power of workers and any of our six measures of the quality
of labor relations.
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Given the high correlation among our various measures of the quality of labor relations–both
across diﬀerent surveys and over time–none of the problems encountered in the construction of
our ownership variables arises here. In fact, all the results we present here are robust to using
any of the six measures from Table 2b. For brevity, we shall work with a single measure, the
IMD measure from 2003. We call it ‘Cooperative Labor Relations’.
Strike Activity in the 1960s
Our survey measures of the quality of labor relations reflect the opinions of executives. It
would be good to know if these opinions also corresponded to more ‘readily observable’ measures
of labor hostility, such as strike activity. The problem with strike data is that strike activity
depends on many factors, notably unemployment. Given that we have a limited number of
countries, controlling for all these factors would leave us with few degrees of freedom. An
alternative approach is to consider a time period in which those factors that commonly aﬀect
strike activity are ‘naturally being controlled for’, e.g., because they were relatively uniform
across countries. The 1960s are such a period: unemployment was uniformly low across Western
countries, while TFP growth was high. Our measure of strike activity in the 1960s–adopted
from Blanchard and Philippon (2004)–is a combination of the number of days lost due to strikes
and the number of workers involved in strikes, normalized by employment.
As Blanchard and Philippon (2004) document, there exists a significant negative relation
between strike activity in the 1960s and the quality of labor relations in the 1990s. Indeed, the
correlation between strike activity in the 1960s and our measure, ‘Cooperative Labor Relations’,
is minus 63%, suggesting that high strike activity in the 1960s can predict hostile labor relations
more than thirty years later.
4 Family Ownership and Labor Relations
4.1 Basic OLS Regressions
Table 4 presents our basic OLS regressions. The first two regressions, shown in columns (i) and
(ii), consider the relation between Cooperative Labor Relations and our two measures of family
control: the fraction of firms controlled by families (20% cutoﬀ) and the fraction of the total
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market capitalization controlled by the top 5 families. Given the way these two measures have
been constructed, there is likely to be a systematic eﬀect of country size. All else equal, the
top 5 families in Sweden are likely to control a greater fraction of the national stock market
capitalization than the top 5 families in the United States. Therefore, we shall always include
the log of the total population in 1995 as a control variable in our regressions. The basic equation
we estimate is:
Fami = α+ β Cooperative Labor Relationsi + γ log
¡
Populationi,1995
¢
+ εi. (2)
As columns (i) and (ii) of Table 4 show, irrespective of which of the two measures of family
control we use, there is a significant negative relation between Cooperative Labor Relations and
the extent of family control.
We have two measures of family control for all 30 countries: the fraction of firms controlled
by families (20% cutoﬀ) and the fraction of the total market capitalization controlled by the top
5 families. As is shown in Tables 3a and 3b, the correlation between these two measures, while
positive, is not perfect. From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear which of the two measures
is a better measure of family control. From an empirical perspective, both are probably noisy
estimates of the truth, and we have just shown that Cooperative Labor Relations is negatively
related to either measure. Moreover, given the large number of robustness checks we wish
to perform, keeping both measures would not be convenient. We therefore construct the first
principal component of our two measures of family control and use it as our main dependent
variable. The first principal component, displayed in the last column in Table 2a, is normalized
with a mean of zero and variance of one. It accounts for 79% of the variance in the two measures,
which have approximately equal weight.
Using the principal component of family control as our dependent variable, we estimate
equation (2) separately for diﬀerent subsamples, for two reasons. First, we want to allow for
systematic diﬀerences between Asian and Western countries. Second, we want to make sure that
our results are robust to dropping those seven countries for which we have only predicted values
based on equation (1). Column (iii) of Table 4 shows the results for Asia, column (iv) shows
the results for Western countries, excluding those countries for which we have only predicted
values, and column (v) shows the results for all Western countries, including those countries
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for which we have only predicted values. The first point to notice is that Cooperative Labor
Relations is negatively related to family control and significant at the 1% level in all three
regressions. The second point to notice is that the coeﬃcients associated with country size and
GNP per capita are diﬀerent for Asian and Western countries. In fact, GNP per capita is not
significant among Western countries, which is perhaps not surprising given that these countries
are relatively similar in their developments. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient associated with
GNP per capita is negative and significant in Asia, suggesting that family ownership is more
prevalent in less developed economies.
We next run a regression for the entire sample, which includes a dummy for Asia as well
as interaction terms of this dummy with country size and GNP per capita. For parsimony, we
restrict the coeﬃcient associated with GNP per capita to zero for Western countries, for it is
otherwise small and insignificant. The results are displayed in column (vi) of Table 4. Like in
our previous regressions, Cooperative Labor Relations is negatively related to family control and
significant at the 1% level.
Before we perform some robustness checks, let us quickly verify that our results are not
driven by outliers. To do so, we regress Cooperative Labor Relations and our measure of family
control separately on the remaining control variables in column (vi) of Table 4. Figure 1 plots
the residuals of the two regressions. The correlation between the residuals is minus 72%. Most
importantly, the figure suggests that our results are not driven by outliers.
One potential shortcoming of our measure of family control is that the samples in CDL-FL-
GLY and LLS include only publicly held firms. To address this shortcoming, we run again the
same regression as in column (vi), except that we replace our measure of family control with
Fogel’s (2005) measure–the labor-weighted fraction of the 10 largest business groups controlled
by families. Unlike our measure of family control, Fogel’s measure is based on a sample that
includes both publicly and privately held firms. Given the small number of observations per
country in Fogel’s sample, we use this measure only here, and only as a robustness check. The
results, which are displayed in column (vii) of Table 4, are consistent with the results from our
previous regressions, namely, Cooperative Labor Relations is negatively related to family control
and significant at the 1% level.
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4.2 Robustness
Our results thus far suggest that the quality of labor relations is a potentially important deter-
minant of family ownership. In this section, we consider various other potential determinants.
In each case, we run a horse race between our measure, Cooperative Labor Relations, and the
alternative determinant in question. The results are reported in Tables 5a to 5c. A quick look
at these tables shows that Cooperative Labor Relations remains negatively related to family
ownership and significant at the 1% level in all regressions. Moreover, the coeﬃcient associated
with Cooperative Labor Relations is quite stable.
Minority Shareholder Protection
The leading explanation for the observed variation in family ownership across countries–
due to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)–is based on diﬀerences in minority
shareholder protection. As the authors show, countries with poor minority shareholder protec-
tion have relatively more family ownership than do countries with good minority shareholder
protection.
La Porta et al. (1998) collect data on six diﬀerent rights protecting minority shareholders: a)
the right to mail proxy votes, b) the interdiction to block shares prior to a general shareholders
meeting, c) the right to cumulative voting for directors and proportional representation on the
board, d) judicial venues to challenge the decisions of management, e.g., in court (‘Oppressed
Minorities Mechanism’), e) preemptive rights to buy new issues of stock, and f) a low minimum
percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders meeting. When we include
all six measures in a single regression (not reported), only the last three are significant, which
is why we focus on them. As column (i) of Table 5a shows, judicial venues to challenge the
decisions of management and a low minimum percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary
shareholders meeting are particularly important determinants of family ownership. But so is
Cooperative Labor Relations, which remains significant at the 1% level.
Law Enforcement
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that a strong system of law enforcement might, in principle,
substitute for weak minority shareholder protection, as courts could then step in and “rescue
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investors abused by the management.” The authors provide data on various measures of law
enforcement. Two of these measures, ‘Eﬃciency of Judicial System’ and ‘Rule of Law’, pertain
to law enforcement proper. As column (ii) of Table 5a shows, neither measure is significant
in our regression. Two other measures, ‘Repudiation of Contracts by Government’ and ‘Risk
of Expropriation’, are not concerned with law enforcement proper, but with the government’s
stance towards private contracting and property rights. Again, neither measure is significant in
our regression (column (iii) of Table 5a). Interestingly, while including measures of law enforce-
ment has virtually no impact on the coeﬃcient associated with Cooperative Labor Relations, it
appears to reduce the significance of GNP per capita in Asia, consistent with the notion that
richer countries have better judicial and political institutions.
Stock Market Development
While our sample consists only of publicly held firms, their ownership structure might nev-
ertheless depend on stock market development, in the sense that countries with more devel-
oped stock markets might have institutions that–similar to the legal protection of minority
shareholders–are more conducive to widely dispersed ownership. A common proxy for stock
market development is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine, 1995; Fisman and Love, 2004). As column (iv) of Table 5a shows, this measure en-
ters with the predicted (i.e., negative) sign, but is–unlike minority shareholder protection–not
significant. One possible reason might be that stock market development matters only in less
developed countries. To address this concern, we interact the ratio of stock market capitalization
to GDP with a dummy for Asia (not reported). The results remain the same.
Income Inequality
One might be worried that Cooperative Labor Relations proxies for income inequality, in
the sense that countries with high income inequality might have worse labor relations. At the
same time, the extent of family ownership might be related to income inequality, in the sense
that countries with high income inequality might be countries in which a few families control a
large fraction of the stock market. For certain countries, this argument might be true. Overall,
however, it seems that it is not. As column (v) of Table 5a shows, income inequality (measured
by the Gini coeﬃcient) is not significant in our regressions. If anything, the magnitude of the
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coeﬃcient associated with Cooperative Labor Relations becomes larger when we control for
income inequality.
Labor Union Power and Labor Regulation
Both Roe (2000, 2003) and this paper argue that family firms are particularly eﬀective at
coping with labor pressure. The question is–and we will address this question solely from an
empirical perspective–where does this labor pressure come from? Roe focuses on measures of
‘formal’ labor empowerment, such as labor regulation and governments’ pro-labor orientation.
Another measure of ‘formal’ labor empowerment, which is not the focus of Roe’s work, is the
bargaining power of labor unions. We begin by looking at labor regulation and union bargaining
power; the role of governments’ pro-labor orientation is considered below.
To examine the eﬀects of labor regulation and union bargaining power on family ownership,
we include three additional variables in our regression: (i) a measure of employment protection,
(ii) a measure of the collective bargaining power of labor unions, both from Botero et al. (2004),
and (iii) a measure of the bargaining power of workers, as perceived by executives, from the
1999 GCR survey. As is shown in Table 3d, the correlation between this last measure and
Cooperative Labor Relations is virtually zero. The results of our regression, which are displayed
in column (i) of Table 5b, show that labor regulation and union bargaining power are not well
suited to explain family ownership. Controlling for the quality of labor relations, none of the
three measures is significant, neither collectively nor individually (not reported). Accordingly,
it is not merely some aspect of labor pressure that matters for family ownership. What matters
is the extent to which labor is hostile or cooperative, which–as we will argue in the following
section–is rooted in a country’s historical experience (and, possibly, in its culture). In contrast,
measures of ‘formal’ labor empowerment, such as labor regulation and union bargaining power,
appear not to matter.
Political Theories
Another measure of ‘formal’ labor empowerment relates to a country’s left-right political
orientation. Countries at the left end of the political spectrum–“social democracies” in Roe’s
(2003) terminology–are more likely to be more labor friendly. To examine the eﬀect of a
country’s pro-labor orientation on family ownership, we include the left-right political index from
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Roe (2003) in our regression.15 The results, which are displayed in column (ii) of Table 5b, show
that a country’s left-right political orientation has no significant eﬀect on the extent of family
ownership. In related work, Pagano and Volpin (2005) develop a political theory of investor and
employment protection, arguing that countries with proportional voting systems have weaker
investor protection but stronger employment protection than do countries with majoritarian
voting systems. To have an alternative measure of a country’s pro-labor orientation, we also
include Pagano and Volpin’s voting index in our regression. The results, which are displayed in
column (iv) of Table 5b, are similar to our previous results: While the voting index enters with
the right sign, it is not significant.
While these results suggest that measures of countries’ political orientation have little ex-
planatory power in predicting family ownership, it does not mean that politics do not matter.
As columns (iii) and (v) of Table 5b show, these measures appear to be well suited to explain
state ownership. In either case, the respective measure–the left-right political index by Roe and
the voting index by Pagano and Volpin–is significant, while our variable, Cooperative Labor
Relations, is not significant.
Social Capital: Labor-Specific or General?
While ‘social capital’ invokes notions of trust and cooperation–trust being either a facilitator
of cooperation or the outcome of past cooperation–the question is: cooperation to pursue what
objectives? Does a high level of trust in, e.g., the political or judicial system, or in people
generally, also imply a high level of cooperation in labor relations? Put diﬀerently, is there
only one ‘type’ of social capital, or is social capital context-specific, in the sense that there are
diﬀerent forms of social capital that are each important, or productive, in diﬀerent social and
economic contexts?16 To address this question, we include five survey-based measures in our
regression that all measure peoples’ trust and confidence–either generally or with regard to
specific institutions.
15For expositional brevity, we only consider aspects of politics related to labor issues. There may be other links
between politics and (family) firms, such as lobbying and political connectedness. For work along these lines, see
Faccio (2006), Fisman (2001), Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000), and Morck and Yeung (2003).
16See Kumar and Matsusaka (2005) for a model along these lines.
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The best known of these five measures is probably ‘General Trust’ (column (i) of Table
5c). This measure, which has been widely used in the literature, shows the percentage of survey
respondents who answer that most people can be trusted.17 ‘Importance of Family’ (column (ii))
shows the percentage of survey respondents who answer that family is very important, while
‘Confidence in Major Companies’ (column (iii)) shows the percentage of survey respondents
who have either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in major companies. Finally, ‘Trust
in Politicians’ (column (iv)) measures the respondents’ confidence in the honesty of politicians,
while ‘Trust in Judiciary’ (column (v)) measures the respondents’ confidence in the independence
of the judiciary.
Table 2e reports the correlations of these five measures both with each other and our measure,
Cooperative Labor Relations. As can be seen, some of these measures are correlated with ours.
However, when we include them in our regressions, only one of them–‘Importance of Family’–
is (barely) significant, while our measure, Cooperative Labor Relations remains significant at
the 1% level in all regressions (columns (i) to (v) of Table 5c). We believe this is good news for
advocates of social capital theories, for it means that we can distinguish among diﬀerent forms
of social capital that are each relevant, or productive, in diﬀerent social and economic contexts.
5 Labor Origin
In this section, we attempt to address the issue of causality by looking into the historical causes
for the observed diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations across countries. We will show that,
for European countries, these diﬀerences can be traced back to diﬀerences in attitudes towards
guilds and labor organizations by the European liberal states in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Based on a classification by historian Colin Crouch, which groups countries into diﬀerent cate-
gories according to their historical experiences, we obtain an instrument for ‘Cooperative Labor
Relations’. We call this instrument ‘Labor Origin’.
In his classic book, Crouch (1993) documents the struggles by the emerging European liberal
states in the 18th and 19th centuries to maintain a political monopoly, or more broadly, to
17Perhaps most closely related to this paper, ‘General Trust’ has been used in La Porta et al. (1997), who
show that it is positively related to the share of sales over GNP by the 20 largest firms in each country.
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claim what he calls ‘political space’. As Crouch remarks, “it is a crucial feature of the classic
liberal political economy that political space is monopolized by specialized political institutions:
legislature, executive, and judiciary. ... That a form of political monopoly lies at the heart of
liberalism may seem paradoxical, but it is part of the important truth that laissez-faire is not
anarchism” (p. 297-298).18
The liberal states’ exclusive claim to political space implied that–to the extent that they
had to struggle to assert this claim–the states became ‘jealous’ of organized interests who
sought to claim political space, notably guilds and labor organizations:19 “Industrial-relations
organizations sought to exercise influence beyond the occupational sphere,” with the eﬀect that
“such organizations ‘moved out’ to occupy such [political] space” (p. 297). According to Crouch,
there is substantial variation in the way the diﬀerent liberal states dealt with the attempt of
guilds and labor organizations to occupy political space–ranging from confrontation to co-
optation–which has had a lasting eﬀect on the countries’ industrial relations until the present.
Crouch groups countries into three broad categories:
‘Political Inhibitors ’: This group includes France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In these countries,
the liberal states’ claim to a political monopoly inhibited the continuing role of labor organi-
zations: “They found themselves on the ‘wrong side’ in the modernization struggle and either
disappeared or became allied with anti-modernizing forces” (p. 300).
The paradigm case of the liberal states’ exclusive claim to political space is the French
Republic: “French republicans from 1789 asserted the sovereignty and inaccessibility of the
state, which stood above and outside society and its many claims” (p. 302). In an eﬀort
to assert their exclusive claims to political space, the French republicans passed the ‘lois Le
Chapelier’ in 1791, a powerful law banning all guilds and trade unions. Until 1884, for almost a
century, labor organizations were illegal in France.20 Weak and ostracized from the beginning,
18All quotes in this section are from Crouch (1993).
19 “To the extent that the liberal state had to struggle to assert its autonomy ... it became exceptionally
‘jealous’ of political space, reluctant to share it, and thus exclusive in its claims to sovereignity” (p. 302).
20 “It is indicative of French liberalism that, although the right to strike was recognized in 1864, unions as such
remained illegal until 1884; organized interests were even more diﬃcult for the French Republic to accept than
overt protest” (p. 327).
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the French labor movement became highly oppositional, which may help explain why it became
anarchist in the early 20th century and later on communist:
“The [French] state rendering itself both inaccessible and dominant, the newly de-
veloping labour movement found little chance of influencing it and therefore became
highly oppositional, much of it embracing first syndicalism and then communism.
This in turn reinforced the existing tendency of the state, because labour rendered
itself increasingly unattractive as a potential ‘social partner’ for either the state or
capital; a process of cumulative social hostility was thus set in train” (p. 302).
Similar forces were at work in the other southern European countries: Italy, Spain, and
Portugal. “In those countries guild structures had become irrevocably tied to reactionary or at
least anti-modern forces and were therefore not part of modernizing coalitions” (p. 313).21
‘Political Facilitators’: This group includes Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
In these countries, the liberal states did not confront guilds but rather sought to co-opt them
into a ‘social partnership’, for the states were dependent on the guilds’ organizational resources
to manage their own public aﬀairs. Far from being excluded, labor organizations thus became
part of the liberal states’ structure. The paradigm case here is Germany:
“While Ständestaat and guild structures are conventionally seen as hindrances to
the realization of the ‘pure’ political forms of the modern nation-state, there are
instances where, for various reasons, states have been dependent on the existence of
such structures for their own strength. The most outstanding instance is Germany.
... The Prussian state did not confront guild structures” (p. 307).
Likewise, the Swiss state did not confront guilds as it depended on their organizational
resources: “The Swiss state was so weak, so liberal, that it lacked the capacity to carry out
its own basic functions and looked to functional interests–starting from guild structures that
21“While in each case both the economies and the forces of liberalism were far weaker than in France–in
Portugal exceptionally so–what liberal regimes there were had still found it necessary to assert a monopoly claim
to political space” (p. 304)
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again faced no major ... confrontation” (p. 308-309).22
‘Political Neutrals’: This group includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the liberal states did not depend on the guilds’
organizational resources to carry out their basic functions (like, e.g., in Austria), nor were the
liberal states ‘jealous’ of the guilds’ attempts to occupy political space (like, e.g., in France):
“This implies a noncommittal neutralism towards organized interests, not the pos-
itive organicism of the unreformed Hapsburg state. This lack of ‘jealousy’ reduced
the extent to which these states confronted guilds and subsequently provoked the
formation of highly oppositional labour movements; the spiral of mutual rejection of
the French case did not apply here” (p. 310)
Let us summarize. In countries classified by Crouch as ‘political inhibitors’, the encounter
between guild society and liberalism provoked the formation of highly oppositional labor move-
ments. In contrast, in countries classified as ‘political facilitators’, the liberal states embraced
the guilds as a ‘social partner’, with the eﬀect that the encounter between guild society and liber-
alism positively facilitated a continuing role for labor organizations. Finally, countries classified
by Crouch as ‘political neutrals’ had broadly neutral experiences. Based on Crouch’s classifica-
tion, we introduce a new variable, ‘Labor Origin’, consisting of dummy variables indicating to
which category a country belongs. If it is correct that, as Crouch argues, the encounter between
liberalism and guild society has had a lasting eﬀect on the countries’ industrial relations until
the present, then Labor Origin might provide us with an instrument that can help explain the
observed diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations across countries today.
In Table 6 we instrument Cooperative Labor Relations using Labor Origin. Using the cate-
gory of ‘political inhibitors’ as our default category, Labor Origin is represented by two dummies:
‘Neutral Labor Origin’, which takes the value one if a country belongs to the category of ‘polit-
ical neutrals’, and ‘Cooperative Labor Origin’, which takes the value one if a country belongs
22The same holds for the Netherlands: “The Dutch state has been more orthodox than the Swiss, but only
partly so. Both countries ... have therefore this distinctive legacy of a state dependent on private groups for the
management of public aﬀairs” (p. 309). Likewise, it holds for the “Hapsburg territories, where state formation
and indeed state maintenance made use of guilds” (p. 319).
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to the category of ‘political facilitators’. On the other hand, La Porta et al. (1998) and La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) emphasize the importance of legal origin for family
ownership. For this reason, we shall include legal origin dummies as control variables in our
regressions. We estimate the following basic equation:
Fami = α+ β Cooperative Labor Relations∗i + γ log
¡
Populationi,1995
¢
(3)
+δ0 Legal Origini + εi,
where Cooperative Labor Relations∗i is instrumented using Labor Origin, and where Legal
Origini is a vector of two dummies representing English and German legal origin, respectively.23
The results of the first-stage regression, which are displayed in column (i) of Table 6, confirm
that Labor Origin has a significant eﬀect on the quality of labor relations today. Also interesting
is the fact that larger countries have systematically worse labor relations than smaller countries.
On the other hand, legal origin appears to have no significant eﬀect on the quality of labor
relations. According to the data, diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations between France
and Sweden are well explained by the diﬀerent sizes of the two countries and their diﬀerent
Labor Origins.
The results of the second-stage regression, which are displayed in column (ii) of Table 6,
show that Cooperative Labor Relations is negatively related to family control and significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that the quality of labor relations has a causal eﬀect on the extent
of family ownership. The coeﬃcient associated with Cooperative Labor Relations is similar to
that in our previous OLS regressions. Moreover, both legal origin dummies are significant and
enter with the predicted sign (see La Porta et al., 1998).
Let us conclude with a brief discussion of the relation between Labor Origin and a country’s
main religion. A quick look at Crouch’s categories shows that the four countries classified as
‘political inhibitors’ are all Catholic countries. Indeed, Crouch does not fail to remark that the
23 In La Porta et al. (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) only French legal origin is
significant in explaining family ownership. Rather than including a dummy for French legal origin, we include
dummies for English, German, and Scandinavian legal origin to allow for systematic diﬀerences between the three
legal origins, using French legal origin as our default category. The Scandinavian legal origin dummy has been
dropped for brevity as it is insignificant.
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Catholic Church’s opposition to modernization caused the liberal states in Catholic countries to
be especially ‘jealous’ of political space.24 In unreported regressions, we use–instead of Labor
Origin–either the fractions of Catholics or Protestants in 1900 as an instrument for Cooperative
Labor Relations. The results are statistically significant, albeit they are weaker than when we
use Labor Origin as our instrument.25
That the results become weaker should not surprise. First, there is no underlying theory–
and Crouch does not argue along these lines–saying that the quality of labor relations should di-
rectly depend on religion. Religion plays, if anything, an indirect role insofar as the liberal states
in Catholic countries had more reason to be ‘jealous’ of political space than their Protestant
counterparts. But even this relation only holds for some Catholic countries, which implies that,
at best, religion is a (noisy) proxy for Labor Origin. For example, a look at Crouch’s categories
shows that Ireland, Belgium, and Austria–three of the most Catholic countries in Europe–are
(only) classified as ‘political neutrals’ and ‘political facilitators’, respectively.26 Likewise, the
four Scandinavian countries–which each had less than one percent Catholics in 1900–are clas-
sified as ‘political neutrals’, while Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland–which all had a
much higher fraction of Catholics in 1900–are classified as ‘political facilitators’.27
6 Family Ownership Across Industries and Countries
In the previous section, we attempted to address the issue of causality by looking into the
historical causes for the observed diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations across countries.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest an alternative methodology to address causality in a cross-
24“The Catholic Church ... became the central rallying point for all forces alienated from modernization” (p.
301). In contrast, in “Protestant states ... the churches (Lutheran and Anglican) made their peace with the state
long before the birth of modernizing forces and created few if any challenges to its authority” (p. 310).
25The R2 of the second-stage regression drops by 23 percentage points, while Cooperative Labor Relations–if
instrumented using either the fractions of Catholics or Protestants in 1900–is only significant at the 5% level,
compared to the 1% level when we use Labor Origin as our instrument. The year 1900 is the earliest year for
which we have the religion data available.
26The percentage share of Catholics in 1900 in these countries ranges from 88.7% (Ireland) to 97.4% (Belgium).
27The percentage shares of Catholics in 1900 in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were 35.7%, 35.1%,
and 39.9%, respectively.
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country context. The basic idea is to focus on within-country variation at the industry level.
In Rajan and Zingales’ study, the question is whether financial development has a causal eﬀect
on economic growth. If this is true, the authors argue, then industries that are more dependent
on external finance should have relatively higher growth rates in countries with more developed
financial markets. That is, if the dependent variable is the growth rate in industry j and
country k, then–controlling for country and industry fixed eﬀects–the interaction term between
industry j’s dependence on external finance and country k’s financial development should be
positive. As Rajan and Zingales note, “such a finding could be the “smoking gun” in the debate
about causality”. In particular, the ability to correct for country fixed eﬀects–which is absent
in a ‘plain’ cross-country regression–alleviates possible concerns about an omitted variable bias.
Following Rajan and Zingales’ methodology, we hypothesize that industries that are more
labor dependent should have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse labor
relations. When constructing our measure of industries’ labor dependence, we encounter the
same conceptual issue as Rajan and Zingales do when constructing their measure of industries’
dependence on external finance: It is problematic to use data on the actual labor shares in each
country, for this information already reflects an equilibrium outcome that is likely to depend on
the qualities of countries’ labor relations. Like Rajan and Zingales do in their study, we therefore
use the United States as our benchmark to compute labor shares for the various industries.
Following standard practice, we compute the labor share of industry j as vlj/(vlj + vkj), where
vlj and vkj denote the values of labor inputs and capital services, respectively, for industry j in
1995.28 Column (i) of Table 7 reports the labor shares for each industry.
As Rajan and Zingales point out, the use of U.S. data as a proxy for industries’ dependence
(here: on labor) in other countries rests on the assumption that there are technological reasons
for why some industries are more labor dependent than others, and these technological diﬀerences
are comparable across countries. We believe this is a reasonable assumption in our case, for the
countries in our sample are all Western European countries whose industries are likely to have
a similar level of technological development as their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, to the extent
28The data to compute labor shares come from Dale Jorgenson’s website at Harvard. The year 1995 is the last
available year in the dataset (35klem96.dat).
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that our U.S.-based measure is a noisy proxy of industries’ labor dependence in other countries,
it will only create a bias against finding any significant results.
Our ownership data is based on Faccio and Lang’s (2002) sample of 5,232 Western European
firms. For 853 firms we lack the industry classification, leaving us with a final sample of 4,379
firms from 13 Western European countries.29 Columns (ii) and (iii) of Table 7 report the number
of firms and the mean fraction of firms controlled by families (20% cutoﬀ), respectively, for each
industry. For any given industry j and country k, we compute the mean fraction of firms
controlled by families in the respective industry and country. Since we have 19 industries and
13 countries, this implies a total of 247 potential observations. In 17 cases there are no firms
in a given industry and country, implying that our final sample consists of 230 observations.
Column (iv) of Table 7 reports the averages of the country means for each industry.
The first equation we estimate includes both industry- and country-level controls but no
fixed eﬀects. It is:
Famjk = α+ β
0 Controlsj,k + γ Labor Sharej × Cooperative Labor Relationsk + εjk, (4)
where Famjk is the mean fraction of firms controlled by families in industry j and country k,
and where Controlsj,k includes–besides Labor Sharej and Cooperative Labor Relationsk–the
log of the total population in 1995. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.30 As
column (i) of Table 8 shows, the interaction term between Labor Sharej and Cooperative Labor
Relationsk is negative and significant at the 1% level, implying that industries that are more
labor dependent have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse labor relations.
Also noteworthy is that the coeﬃcient associated with Labor Sharej is positive and significant,
implying that industries that are more labor dependent have more family ownership. This last
result is not surprising. After all, the origins of the widely held firm in the Unites States go back
to the enormous financing needs by heavily capital-intensive industries–in particular utilities
and textile manufacturing–in the early 19th century. The breakthrough, of course, came in the
mid 19th century with the growth of the railroad industry (Berle and Means, 1932).31
29We are grateful to Mara Faccio for providing us with the industry classifications.
30The results are similar if we cluster standard errors at the industry level.
31 “Railroad construction, involving a heavy initial outlay of capital, almost necessitated recourse to the cor-
29
Before we proceed, let us quickly verify that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient associated
with Cooperative Labor Relations is consistent with our previous results. When we rerun the
regression displayed in column (i) of Table 4–which has the fraction of firms controlled by
families (20% cutoﬀ) as the dependent variable–for the 13 Western European countries in
Faccio and Lang (2002), we obtain a point estimate of -0.072 for the coeﬃcient associated with
Cooperative Labor Relations. As can be easily computed from Table 7, the average labor share
across all industries, weighted by the number of firms in each industry, is approximately 0.632.
Hence, we can compute the total coeﬃcient associated with Cooperative Labor Relations from
column (i) of Table 8 as 0.066 + 0.632 × (−0.207) ≈ −0.065, which is close to our previous
estimate of -0.072.32
The possibility that there might be omitted variables–at either the country or industry
level–that drive both our dependent and our main independent variable (i.e., the interaction
term) is major concern in the debate about causality. Correcting for industry and country fixed
eﬀects alleviates this concern. The next regression we run therefore includes–instead of specific
industry- and country-level controls–industry and country fixed eﬀects, implying that the only
eﬀects that are identified are those relative to variables that vary both across countries and
across industries. The equation we estimate is:
Famjk = α+ β Labor Sharej ×Cooperative Labor Relationsk + ηj + ξk + εjk, (5)
where ηj and ξk are industry and country dummies, respectively. As column (ii) of Table 8 shows,
the interaction term between Labor Sharej and Cooperative Labor Relationsk is again negative
and significant at the 1% level, confirming that our previous results are robust to including fixed
eﬀects. Note that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient associated with the interaction term is similar
to that in column (i), while the R2 is naturally higher given that we have corrected for industry
and country fixed eﬀects. Overall, we believe these results are–in conjunction with our previous
instrumental variables results–supportive of the fact that the quality of labor relations has a
causal eﬀect on the extent of family ownership.
porate form” (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 13).
32The coeﬃcients in Table 8 are rounded to two decimals; hence 0.066 ≈ 0.07 and −0.207 ≈ −0.21.
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7 Strike Activity
7.1 Quebec versus the Rest of Canada
While our measure of the quality of labor relations can explain some of the observed variation
in family ownership across countries, it is a survey-based measure. It would be interesting to
know if similar results also obtained using more ‘readily observable’ measures of labor hostility,
such as strike activity. We begin this final part of our study by looking at Canada. Canada is
particularly interesting for our purposes, because Quebec has a French tradition, while the rest
of Canada has an Anglo-Saxon tradition. Hence, we can see if our previous results also hold
for diﬀerent regions within a country. According to Crouch’s (1993) classification (see Section
5), France is a ‘political inhibitor’, while the United Kingdom is a ‘political neutral’. Hence,
we would expect to find more labor hostility in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. And if our
previous cross-country results extend to diﬀerent regions within a country, then we would also
expect to find that Quebec has more family ownership than the rest of Canada.
We have strike data from 1953 until 2002, both for Quebec separately and for Canada as
a whole, where strike activity is defined as the number of person-days lost due to strikes and
lockouts. A look at the data confirms that the average strike activity in Quebec is significantly
higher than in the rest of Canada.33 As for the extent of family ownership, Attig and Gadhoum
(2003) provide ultimate ownership data both for Quebec separately and for Canada as a whole
for the year 1996. Their sample includes 1,112 publicly held companies, 155 of which are
headquartered in Quebec. Consistent with our basic hypothesis, Attig and Gadhoum find that
family ownership is more pervasive in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. While 57% of all firms
in Quebec are controlled by families (20% cutoﬀ), only 38% of the firms in the rest of Canada
are controlled by families. The diﬀerence is significant at the 1% level.
While these results are supportive of our basic argument, it should be noted that Quebec,
like France, has a Civil Law code, while the remaining Canadian provinces have a Common Law
code. And yet, the relevant corporation law is the same for firms in Quebec and in the rest of
Canada, which makes it rather unlikely that the observed diﬀerences in family ownership are
33To account for the diﬀerent numbers of workers in Quebec and in the rest of Canada, we normalize the
number of person-days lost due to strikes by the number of salaried workers.
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due to diﬀerences in minority shareholder protection. As Attig and Gadhoum (2003) point out,
“traded firms in Quebec and in the rest of Canada are created under the same law: Canada
Business Corporations Act. In addition, stock market regulations in the diﬀerent provinces of
Canada are not remarkably diﬀerent.”
7.2 Strike Activity in the 1960s
We now finally return to our original cross-country study, except that we use actual strike data
instead of survey-based measures of labor relations. The problem with using strike data is that
strike activity commonly depends on many factors, notably unemployment. Given that we have
a limited number of countries, controlling for all these factors would leave us with few degrees
of freedom. Fortunately, in the 1960s many of the factors that commonly aﬀect strike activity–
including unemployment and TFP growth–were relatively uniform across Western countries,
which makes this period ideal for our study. Our measure of strike activity is adopted from
Blanchard and Philippon (2004), who elaborate further on the advantages of using strike data
from the 1960s. Greece, Portugal, and Spain have been excluded from our sample: All three
countries were dictatorships in the 1960s, and strikes were illegal.
The results of our regression, which are displayed in column (i) of Table 9, confirm our
previous findings using survey-based measures of the quality of labor relations: Strike activity
in the 1960s is positively related to the extent of family ownership thirty years later, and the
result is significant at the 5% level.34 Prima facie, reverse causality should not be a major
concern, as our dependent variable is from the 1990s, while our independent variable is from
the 1960s. And yet, given that the dependent variable may be persistent, we cannot rule out
reverse causality. To address this concern, we instrument strike activity in the 1960s using Labor
Origin (see Section 5). The results of the first-stage regression, which are displayed in column
(ii) of Table 9, show that Labor Origin has a significant eﬀect on strike activity in the 1960s.
More importantly, the results of the second-stage regression, which are displayed in column (iii),
confirm our previous OLS results that strike activity in the 1960s has a positive eﬀect on the
extent of family ownership thirty years later.
34 In fact, it is significant at the 2% level.
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8 Conclusion
Why do some countries have more family ownership than others? One explanation, which
is supported by the empirical evidence, is that family ownership is an optimal response to
insuﬃcient legal protection of minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer,
1999). This argument is consistent with the widely held view that the ownership structure of
firms is chosen to minimize the agency costs arising from conflicts between shareholders and
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Rather than focusing on the shareholder-manager conflict, this paper focuses on labor con-
flict to explain cross-country diﬀerences in family ownership. Using survey-based measures of
the quality of labor relations, we find that countries with hostile labor relations have relatively
more family ownership than do countries with cooperative labor relations. This result holds
for diﬀerent measures of family ownership as well as diﬀerent subsamples (e.g., Asia, Europe,
Western Countries). The result also holds if we control for minority shareholder protection, law
enforcement, stock market development, income inequality, labor regulation, union bargaining
power, and other potential determinants of family ownership, including measures of social cap-
ital. Finally, the result holds if–instead of using survey-based measures of the quality of labor
relations–we use actual strike data from the 1960s. As it turns out, strike activity in the 1960s
can predict cross-country variation in family ownership thirty years later.
We address causality in two diﬀerent ways. First, we look into the historical causes for the
observed diﬀerences in the quality of labor relations across countries. Based on diﬀerences in
the way the emerging European liberal states in the 18th and 19th centuries dealt with guilds
and labor organizations, we obtain an instrument for our survey-based measure of the quality
of labor relations. The instrumental variables results support our previous OLS results. The
second way to address causality is to make use of within-country variation at the industry level.
We find that–controlling for industry and country fixed eﬀects–industries that are more labor
dependent have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse labor relations, which,
again, supports our previous OLS results.
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(i) (ii)
1.14 6.85
4.35 2.53
Log(Employees) 0.42 0.10
3.50 0.07
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES
N 408 278
R2 0.10
Dependent Variable
Notes: Logit (column (i)) and OLS (column (ii)) regressions. Coefficients are in bold, z- and t-
statistics, respectively, are listed below the coefficients. 'Strike Activity' is a dummy taking the 
value zero if the firm witnessed no strike in the three years prior to 1998, when the Enquête 
Réponses survey was conducted. 'Union Density' is the percentage of firm employees that are 
unionized. 'Widely Held Firm' is a dummy taking the value zero if the founder or a member of the 
founder's family holds at least 20% of the voting rights. For a description of the firm data, see 
Sraer and Thesmar (2004).
Table A: Strike Activity and Union Density in Publicly Listed French Firms
Strike Activity Union Density
Widely Held Firm
Variable Description and Data Source
Fraction of Firms Controlled by 
Families
Fraction of Total Market 
Capitalization Controlled by Top 5 
Families
Fraction of Medium-Sized Firms 
Controlled by Families
Fraction of Value of Top 20 Firms 
Controlled by Families
Fraction of Top 20 Firms Controlled 
by Families
Fraction of Top 10 Business Groups 
Controlled by Families
See Section 3.1 for a description. Source: Fogel (2005), Table I.
State Ownership See Section 3.1 for a description. Sources: Faccio and Lang (2002), Tables 3; 
Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005), Table 1; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1999), Table III.
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in 1995. Source: 'smv_g95s' from 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/gbk_allvar.xls.
Cooperative Labor Relations Measures the extent to which labor relations are hostile or cooperative based on a 
survey of 4,256 executives in 59 countries conducted by the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) in 2003. Source: item 3.2.06 in the 2003 World 
Competitiveness Yearbook.
Strikes are rare and always quickly 
resolved with minimum economic 
losses
Measures the frequency and severeness of strikes based on a survey of 4,000 
executives in 59 countries conducted by the World Economic Forum. Source: item 7.08 
in the 1999 Global Competitiveness Report.
Collective Bargaining Power of 
Workers is High
Measures the bargaining power of workers based on a survey of 4,000 executives in 59 
countries conducted by the World Economic Forum. Source: item 7.10 in the 1999 
Global Competitiveness Report.
Strike Activity in the 1960s A combination of the number of person days lost due to strikes and the number of 
workers involved in strikes, normalized by employment. See Blanchard and Philippon 
(2004) for a description.
Log(GNP_Per_Capita) Natural logarithm of GNP per capita in 1997. Source: 'ln_gnppc97' from 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/labor_dataset_4_01_03.xls.
Labor Share See Section 6 for a description, and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) for a further discussion 
of the data. Source: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html.
Table 1: Description of Variables
See Section 3.1 for a description. Sources: Clasessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), 
Tables 6 and 9; Faccio and Lang (2002), Tables 3 and 10; Gadhoum, Lang, and Young 
(2005), Table 1.
See Section 3.1 for a description. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1999), Tables II, III, and V.
Labor Origin See Section 5 for a description. Source: Crouch (1993), Chapter 9.
Income Inequality Gini coefficient from early 1990s. See La Porta et al. (1998) for a description. Source: 
"gini" from http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/trustvar.xls.
Oppressed Minorities Mechanism
Preemptive Right to New Issues
Percentage of Share Capital to Call 
Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting
Rule of Law
Efficiency of Judicial System
Repudiation of Contracts by 
Government
Risk of Expropriation
Collective Bargaining Index
Employment Protection Index
Left-Right Political Index Source: Table 6.5 in Roe (2003).
Proportionality of Voting System Measures the extent to which voting systems are proportional or majoritarian. Source: 
Table 2 in Pagano and Volpin (2005).
General Trust Measures the extent to which people believe that most people can be trused. Source: 
item A165 in the 2000 World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2004).
Importance of Family Measures the extent to which people believe that family is important. Source: item A001 
in the 2000 World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2004).
Confidence in Major Companies Measures the extent to which people have confidence in major companies. Source: item 
E081 in the 2000 World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2004).
Trust in Judiciary Measures the independence of the judiciary based on a survey of 4,000 executives in 59 
countries conducted by the World Economic Forum. Source: item 8.05 in the 1999 
Global Competitiveness Report.
Trust in Politicians Measures the financial honesty of politicians based on a survey of 4,000 executives in 
59 countries conducted by the World Economic Forum. Source: item 8.19 in the 1999 
Global Competitiveness Report.
Legal Origin See La Porta et al. (1999) for a description. Source: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/qgov_web.xls.
See Botero et al. (2004) for a description. Sources: 'index_col_barg1' and 
'index_emp_prot1', respectively, from 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/labor_dataset_4_01_03.xls.
See La Porta et al. (1998) for a description. Source: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/l&fweb.xls.
Variable Code Sample Used Number of Firms
Fraction of Total Market 
Capitalization Controlled 
by Top 5 Families
Fraction of Firms 
Controlled by Families 
Fraction of Medium-
Sized Firms Controlled 
by Families
Fraction of Value of 
Top 20 Firms 
Controlled by 
Families
Fraction of Top 20 
Firms Controlled by 
Families
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Data Source FL & CDL FL & CDL LLS LLS LLS
Australia AUS LLS 20 . . 0.50 0.12 0.05 -0.03
Austria AUT FL 99 0.16 0.53 0.17 0.06 0.15 -0.10
Belgium BEL FL 130 0.20 0.52 0.40 0.41 0.50 0.20
Canada CAN LLS 20 . . 0.30 0.28 0.25 -0.17
Denmark DNK LLS 20 . . 0.40 0.32 0.35 0.01
Finland FIN FL 129 0.14 0.49 0.20 0.06 0.10 -0.40
France FRA FL 607 0.22 0.65 0.50 0.26 0.20 0.94
Germany GER FL 704 0.16 0.65 0.40 0.08 0.10 0.45
Greece GRE LLS 20 . . 1.00 0.47 0.50 1.70
Hong Kong HKG CDL 330 0.26 0.67 0.90 0.63 0.70 1.24
Indonesia IDN CDL 178 0.41 0.72 . . . 2.52
Ireland IRL FL 69 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.10 -1.67
Israel ISR LLS 20 . . 0.60 0.31 0.50 0.08
Italy ITA FL 208 0.17 0.60 0.60 0.14 0.15 0.30
Japan JPN CDL 1240 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.05 -2.96
Korea KOR CDL 345 0.30 0.48 0.50 0.22 0.20 1.65
Malaysia MAL CDL 238 0.17 0.67 . . . 0.24
Netherlands NLD LLS 20 . . 0.20 0.06 0.20 -1.29
New Zealand NZL LLS 20 . . 0.29 0.15 0.25 -0.78
Norway NOR FL 155 0.16 0.39 0.40 0.13 0.25 -0.72
Philippines PHI CDL 120 0.43 0.45 . . . 1.46
Portugal PRT FL 87 0.25 0.60 0.50 0.38 0.45 0.92
Singapore SGP CDL 221 0.20 0.55 0.40 0.15 0.30 0.16
Spain ESP FL 632 0.07 0.56 0.30 0.17 0.15 -0.61
Sweden SWE FL 245 0.09 0.47 0.60 0.35 0.45 -0.85
Switzerland SWI FL 214 0.24 0.48 0.50 0.29 0.30 0.34
Taiwan TWN CDL 141 0.15 0.48 . . . 0.40
Thailand THA CDL 167 0.32 0.62 . . . 1.32
United Kingdom UK FL 1953 0.04 0.24 0.40 0.00 0.00 -2.30
United States USA GLY 3607 . 0.20 0.10 0.18 0.20 -2.04
Notes: 'CDL' is Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); 'FL' is Faccio and Lang (2002); 'LLS' is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999); 'GLY' is Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005). 'Principal 
Component' is the first principal component of columns 5 and 6 (the two 'FL & CDL' columns). For Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Israel, Netherlands, and New Zealand, predicted values based on 
LLS have been used to account for the missing entries in the two 'FL & CDL' columns. See Section 3.1 for further details.
Table 2a: Ownership Data
Variable
Strikes are rare and 
always quickly resolved 
with minimum economic 
losses
The collective 
bargaining power of 
workers is high
Data Source GCR 1993 GCR 1999 GCR 2003 GCR 1999 GCR 1999 IMD 1999 IMD 2003
Australia 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.9 5.8 7.0
Austria 6.0 6.1 5.7 7.0 5.5 7.6 7.7
Belgium 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.5
Canada 4.4 4.8 4.9 4.5 4.6 6.1 6.6
Denmark 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.0 7.7 7.4
Finland 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.0 6.0 7.1 7.6
France 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.2 4.4 4.4 4.3
Germany 5.3 5.3 4.7 5.6 5.3 7.0 5.6
Greece 4.4 3.9 4.1 3.1 4.3 4.8 5.6
Hong Kong 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.3 2.8 7.3 7.5
Indonesia 4.5 4.8 3.7 3.3 3.6 5.0 3.6
Ireland 5.2 5.2 5.0 5.3 4.8 7.1 7.6
Israel 5.0 4.7 4.3 3.7 5.0 6.5 6.1
Italy 4.3 4.2 3.8 3.6 4.6 5.0 4.8
Japan 6.0 6.1 5.4 6.2 4.2 7.7 7.6
Korea 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.3 4.6 3.6 3.6
Malaysia 5.3 5.7 5.6 6.2 4.2 7.3 7.3
Netherlands 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.2 7.7 7.4
New Zealand 5.4 5.6 4.7 5.8 3.6 7.7 6.9
Norway 5.7 5.7 4.9 4.7 5.7 7.4 7.4
Philippines 4.4 4.3 3.7 3.7 4.7 6.0 5.1
Portugal 4.8 5.0 4.4 4.9 3.8 6.3 5.3
Singapore 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.8 4.2 8.9 8.6
Spain 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.8 4.6 5.7 5.5
Sweden 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.2 5.8 7.4 7.1
Switzerland 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.7 3.4 8.0 8.2
Taiwan 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.9 3.7 6.9 7.1
Thailand 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.0 3.7 6.2 6.5
United Kingdom 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.6 3.5 6.9 6.7
United States 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.1 4.1 6.2 6.4
Notes: 'GCR' is Global Competitiveness Report; 'IMD' is World Competitiveness Yearbook. The scale for GCR is from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The corresponding scale for IMD is from 1 to 10.
Labor relations are generally … 
(hostile, productive)
Table 2b: Labor Relations Data
Labor/employer relations are generally cooperative
Table 3: Correlation Matrices
3a: Family Ownership in Asia. N = 9, CDL (2000)
Fraction of Total Market Capitalization Controlled by Top 5 
Families 1.00
Fraction of Firms Controlled by Families 0.58 1.00
3b: Family Ownership in Europe. N = 13, FL (2002)
Fraction of Total Market Capitalization Controlled by Top 5 
Families 1.00
Fraction of Firms Controlled by Families 0.54 1.00
Fraction of Medium-Sized Firms Controlled by Families 1.00
Fraction of Value of Top 20 Firms Controlled by Families  0.75* 1.00
Fraction of Top 20 Firms Controlled by Families  0.67*  0.93* 1.00
Cooperative Labor Relations (GCR 1993) 1
Cooperative Labor Relations (GCR 1999) 0.97* 1
Cooperative Labor Relations (GCR 2003) 0.89* 0.90* 1
Strikes Are Rare and Quickly Resolved (GCR 1999) 0.86* 0.91* 0.88* 1
Collective Bargaining Power of Workers (GCR 1999) 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.16 1
Cooperative Labor Relations (IMD 1999) 0.94* 0.94* 0.87* 0.88* 0.02 1
Cooperative Labor Relations (IMD 2003) 0.85* 0.83* 0.91* 0.82* 0.06 0.90* 1
Cooperative Labor Relations (IMD 2003) 1
General Trust (WVS 2000) 0.39* 1
Importance of Family (WVS 2000) -0.25 -0.16 1
Confidence in Major Companies (WVS 2000) 0.07 0.18 0.33 1
Trust in Politicians (GCR 1999) 0.68* 0.47* -0.32 0.2 1
Trust in Judiciary (GCR 1999) 0.64* 0.43* -0.31 0.09 0.78* 1
 Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level or higher.
3c: Family Ownership in Developed Countries. N = 25, LLS (1999)
3d: Survey Measures of Labor Relations and Workers' Bargaining Power. N = 30
3e: Survey Measures of Labor Relations and Social Capital. N = 26-30
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Dependent Variable
Fraction of Firms 
Controlled by 
Families
Fraction of Total 
Market Capitalization 
Controlled by Top 5 
Families
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Fraction of Top 10 
Business Groups 
Controlled by 
Families 
Sample All Countries All Countries Asia FL + US West All Countries All Countries
-0.09 -0.05 -0.68 -0.91 -0.86 -0.71 -0.13
-4.00 -3.30 -3.81 -3.59 -3.49 -5.10 -2.74
-0.06 -0.02 -0.99 -0.58 -0.55 -0.47 -0.1
-2.65 -1.35 -4.41 -2.81 -2.83 -3.05 -1.88
-0.72 1.22 0.55
-3.29 1.64 0.84
12.90 1.68
3.00 1.15
-0.53 -0.03
-1.92 -0.29
-0.70 -0.14
-2.80 -1.62
N 30 30 9 14 21 30 30
R2 0.38 0.30 0.90 0.46 0.48 0.70 0.42
Adj. R2 0.33 0.24 0.84 0.36 0.38 0.64 0.30
Cooperative Labor Relations
Log(Population)
Log(GNP_Per_Capita)
Table 4: Family Ownership and Labor Relations
Asia Dummy
Asia Dummy * Log(Population)
Asia Dummy * 
Log(GNP_Per_Capita)
Notes: OLS Regressions. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. 'Principal Component' is the first principal component of the two measures of family 
control in columns (i) and (ii).  'Asia' includes the 9 countries from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 'FL + US' includes the 13 European countries from Faccio and Lang 
(2002) plus the United States from Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005). 'West' includes the 'FL + US' sample plus 7 additional countries with predicted values using data from La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999): Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. 'All Countries' includes all countries from Table 2a.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent Variable Principal Component of Family Control
Principal Component 
of Family Control
Principal Component 
of Family Control
Principal Component 
of Family Control
Principal Component 
of Family Control
-0.65 -0.62 -0.63 -0.64 -0.76
-5.79 -3.16 -4.17 -3.70 -5.22
-0.36 -0.48 -0.37 -0.42 -0.49
-2.86 -2.87 -2.25 -2.39 -3.17
18.14 11.87 11.29 15.38 10.73
4.59 2.54 2.32 2.80 2.28
-0.95 -0.56 -0.54 -0.70 -0.45
-3.79 -2.00 -1.99 -1.94 -1.56
-0.77 -0.57 -0.57 -0.76 -0.58
-3.19 -1.81 -1.77 -2.86 -2.12
-1.19
-3.99
-0.42
-1.54
-6.28
-2.21
0.06
0.46
-0.16
-1.26
0.48
1.20
-0.77
-1.66
-0.34
-0.74
Income Inequality 0.03
1.10
N 29 30 30 30 30
R2 0.84 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.72
Adj. R2 0.77 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.64
Table 5a: Alternative Determinants of Family Ownership (I)
Oppressed Minorities Mechanism 
(LLSV)
Percentage of Share Capital to 
Call Extraordinary Shareholder 
Meeting (LLSV)
Preemptive Right to New Issues 
(LLSV)
Asia Dummy * Log(Population)
Asia Dummy * 
Log(GNP_Per_Capita)
Cooperative Labor Relations
Log(Population)
Asia Dummy
Notes:  OLS Regressions. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. 'LLSV' is La Porta et al. (1998). The samples include al
countries from Table 2a, except for column (i) (Philippines missing).
Repudiation of Contracts by 
Government (LLSV)
Rule of Law (LLSV)
Efficiency of Judicial System 
(LLSV)
Risk of Expropriation (LLSV)
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent Variable Principal Component of Family Control
Principal Component 
of Family Control State Ownership
Principal Component 
of Family Control State Ownership
-0.70 -0.75 0.01 -0.80 0.00
-4.15 -3.50 0.62 -4.08 0.36
-0.50 -0.65 -0.01 -0.51 -0.01
-2.98 -2.69 -0.42 -2.48 -0.68
11.71
2.19
-0.50
-1.62
-0.61
-1.78
-0.13
-0.17
0.98
0.75
-0.17
-0.75
-0.06 -0.05
-0.13 -2.07
0.10 0.02
0.53 1.75
N 30 16 16 21 21
R2 0.72 0.63 0.51 0.57 0.34
Adj R2 0.61 0.54 0.39 0.50 0.22
Notes:  OLS Regressions. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. 'BDLLS' is Botero et al. (2004); 'GCR' is Global 
Competitiveness Report (1999); 'Roe' is Roe (2003); 'PV' is Pagano and Volpin (2005). The sample in column (i) includes all countries in Table 2a. The 
samples in columns (ii) to (v) are matched samples of the countries in Table 2a and those in 'PV' and 'Roe', respectively.
Table 5b: Alternative Determinants of Family Ownership (II)
Cooperative Labor Relations
Log(Population)
Asia Dummy
Collective Bargaining Power of 
Workers is High (GCR)
Collective Bargaining Index (BDLLS)
Employment Protection Index 
(BDLLS)
Left-Right Political Index (Roe)
Proportionality of Voting System (PV)
Asia Dummy * Log(Population)
Asia Dummy * 
Log(GNP_Per_Capita)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dependent Variable
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
Principal 
Component of 
Family Control
-0.68 -0.71 -0.64 -0.80 -0.70
-4.05 -4.78 -3.54 -4.84 -3.53
-0.49 -0.44 -0.55 -0.46 -0.47
-2.97 -2.71 -2.84 -2.96 -2.94
11.44 13.27 14.89 12.23 12.75
2.24 2.82 1.89 2.80 2.73
-0.41 -0.45 -0.53 -0.45 -0.53
-1.20 -1.52 -0.98 -1.54 -1.86
-0.70 -0.83 -0.95 -0.70 -0.69
-2.45 -2.95 -2.60 -2.81 -2.54
-0.58
-0.48
-5.46
-1.84
-2.45
-1.18
0.18
0.96
-0.02
-0.09
N 27 26 20 30 30
R2 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.72 0.70
Adj R2 0.63 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.63
Trust in Judiciary (CGR)
Notes: OLS regressions. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. 'GCR' is Global Competitiveness Report; 'WVS' is 
World Values Survey. The samples in columns (iv) and (v) include all countries in Table 2a. The samples in columns (i) to (iii) are matched 
samples of the countries in Table 2a and those in the respective 'WVS' entries.
Cooperative Labor Relations
Log(Population)
Asia Dummy
Confidence in Major Companies 
(WVS)
Asia Dummy * Log(Population)
Asia Dummy * Log(GNP_Per_Capita)
Table 5c: Alternative Determinants of Family Ownership (III)
Importance of Family (WVS)
General Trust (WVS)
Trust in Politicians (CGR)
(i) (ii)
Dependent Variable Cooperative Labor Relations
Principal Component of 
Family Control
-0.89
-4.31
-0.66 -0.66
-3.35 -3.29
0.72 -0.9
1.3 -2.56
-0.12 1.37
-0.21 4.09
0.96
1.8
1.92
2.66
2SLS 2SLS
(First Stage) (Second Stage)
N 15 15
R2 0.84 0.89
Table 6: Instrumenting Cooperative Labor Relations Using Labor Origin
Log(Population)
English Legal Origin
Notes: Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. The 
sample includes the 13 countries from Faccio and Lang (2002) plus 2 additional 
countries with predicted values using data from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999): Denmark and the Netherlands.
German Legal Origin
Neutral Labor Origin
Cooperative Labor Relations
Cooperative Labor Origin
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Mining, Oil, and Gas 0.39 126 0.41 0.53
Construction 0.89 174 0.41 0.45
Food 0.57 209 0.59 0.63
Wood, Lumber, and Paper 0.68 140 0.56 0.63
Printing and Publishing 0.76 88 0.58 0.66
Chemicals 0.55 168 0.49 0.43
Rubber, Plastics, Stone, Glass, and Concrete 0.79 182 0.60 0.67
Primary Metals 0.76 91 0.45 0.39
Fabricated Metals 0.71 107 0.43 0.43
Industrial, Commercial Machinery, and Computer Equipment 0.79 234 0.51 0.49
Electronic, Electrical, and Measuring Equipment 0.70 240 0.48 0.47
Transportation Equipment 0.81 121 0.48 0.55
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.65 190 0.60 0.74
Transportation Services 0.76 167 0.52 0.53
Communication and Entertainment 0.46 117 0.42 0.46
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 0.35 140 0.35 0.30
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.78 573 0.46 0.61
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.43 1023 0.32 0.38
Miscellaneous Business Services 0.72 289 0.45 0.53
Notes: 'Labor Share' is computed as vl/(vl+vk), where vl and vk denote the values of labor inputs and capital services, respectively, for the United States in 1995. See 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) for a description of the data. The sample is based on the 5,232 firms and 13 Western European countries from Faccio and Lang (2002). For 
853 firms the industry classification is unavailable, reducing the final sample to 4,379 firms.
Table 7: Family Ownership Across Industries and Countries - Summary Statistics
Labor Share Number of Firms
Fraction of Firms 
Controlled by Families 
(All Firms)
Variable
Fraction of Firms 
Controlled by
Families (Average of 
Country Means)
(i) (ii)
-0.21 -0.19
-3.18 -2.90
0.07
1.00
1.60
3.77
-0.01
-0.18
Country Fixed Effects NO YES
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES
N 230 230
R2 0.12 0.42
Dependent Variable
Notes: OLS regressions. Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. The sample is based on the 4,379 firms, 19 industries, and 13 
Western European countries from Table 7. An observation is the mean fraction of firms controlled by 
families in industry j and country k; hence there are 13 x 19 = 247 potential observations. There are 17 
missing observations, i.e., there is no firm in a particular industry and country, reducing the final sample 
to 230 observations.
Table 8: Family Ownership Across Industries and Countries
Fraction of Firms 
Controlled by Families
Fraction of Firms 
Controlled by Families
Labor Share * Cooperative Labor Relations
Cooperative Labor Relations
Labor Share
Log(Population)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Dependent Variable Principal Component of Family Control
Strike Activity in 
the 1960s
Principal Component of 
Family Control
0.61 0.52
2.82 2.72
-1.45 -0.08 -0.05
-1.04 -1.29 -0.37
-0.96 0.85 -1.83
-2.72 5.15 -4.85
0.94 0.14 0.85
2.01 0.64 2.35
-2.6
-12.26
-2.8
-11.49
OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(First Stage) (Second Stage)
N 17 13 13
R2 0.62 0.98 0.82
Table 9: Strike Activity in the 1960s and Family Ownership in the 1990s
Log(Population)
English Legal Origin
Notes: Coefficients are in bold, t-statistics are listed below the coefficients. In column (iii) 'Strike 
Activity in the 1960s' is instrumented using Labor Origin. The sample in column (i) includes the 13 
countries from Faccio and Lang (2002), except for Portugal and Spain, plus the United States from 
Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005), plus 5 additional countries with predicted values using data 
from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999): Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and New Zealand. The samples in columns (ii) and (iii) include the 15 countries from Table 6, except 
for Portugal and Spain. Portugal and Spain have been excluded because they were dictatorships in 
the 1960s, and strikes were illegal.
German Legal Origin
Neutral Labor Origin
Strike Activity in the 1960s
Cooperative Labor Origin
Notes: Plot of residuals from regression (vi) in Table 4. 'Cooperative Labor Relations' and 'Principal Component of Family Control' are regressed 
separately on Log(population), Log(GNP_Per_Capita), Asia Dummy, Asia Dummy * Log(Population), and Asia Dummy * Log(GNP_Per_Capita). The 
sample includes all countries in Table 2a.
Figure 1: Residual Labor Cooperation and Residual Family Control
AUS
AUT
BEL
CANDNK
ESP
FIN
FRA
GER
GRE
HKG
IDN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MAL NLD
NOR
NZL
PHI
PRT
SGP
SWE
SWI
THA
TWN
UK
USA
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
-2 -1 0 1 2
Residual Family Control
